U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

H4

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
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Washington, D.C. 20536

[redacted] identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

FILE: [redacted] Office: MIAMI, FLORIDA Date: JAN 03 2002

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

Public Copy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of $110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Director,
Administrative Appeals Office

[redacted]

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Miami, Florida, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Venezuela who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of one year or more. The applicant married a citizen of the United States in May 1999 and is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative. She seeks the above waiver in order to remain in the United States and reside with her spouse and daughter.

The district director determined that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant states that the decision to deny her waiver request is cruel and unusual, the Service cannot sponsor the destruction of her marriage, and the evidence submitted clearly overcomes the requirement of extreme hardship to her spouse.

The record reflects that the applicant initially entered the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure on April 14, 1996 and remained longer than authorized. She was unlawfully present in the United States from April 1, 1997, the date the calculation for unlawful presence begins, until February 3, 2000 when she filed an application for adjustment of status based on her marriage to a United States citizen. The applicant departed the United States on or after May 10, 2000 and returned in parole status on August 3, 2000.

Section 212(a) of the Act states:

> CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.- Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:
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> (9) ALIENS PREVIOUSLY REMOVED.-
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> * * *
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> (B) ALIENS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT.-
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> (i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien (other than an alien

> lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-
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> * * *
>
> (II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure from the United States, is inadmissible.
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> * * *
>
> (v) WAIVER.-The Attorney General has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by the Attorney General regarding a waiver under this clause.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). An appeal must be decided according to the law as it exists on the date it is before the appellate body. See Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 710-1 (1974); Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996, A.G. 1997). In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered.

If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statue more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. Matter of George, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); Matter of Leveque, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

After reviewing the IIRIRA amendments to the Act relating to fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence in the United States, and after noting the increased penalties Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar in some

instances, eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, and providing a ground of inadmissibility for unlawful presence after April 1, 1997, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence of aliens in the United States.

The Board has held that extreme hardship is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible meaning, and that the elements to establish extreme hardship are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. These factors should be viewed in light of the Board's statement that a restrictive view of extreme hardship is not mandated either by the Supreme Court or by its own case law. See Matter of L-O-G-, Interim Decision 3281 (BIA 1996).

It is noted that the requirements to establish extreme hardship in the present waiver proceedings under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act do not include a showing of hardship to the alien as did former cases involving suspension of deportation. Present waiver proceedings require a showing of extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. This requirement is identical to the extreme hardship requirement stipulated in the amended fraud waiver proceedings under section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(i).

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, Interim Decision 3380 (BIA 1999), the Board stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established "extreme hardship" in waiver proceedings under section 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; (2) the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; (3) the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; (4) the financial impact of departure from this country; (5) and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

On appeal, the applicant submits a statement from her spouse dated February 7, 2001 asserting that he and his step-daughter (the applicant's child) would suffer extreme hardship if the applicant were removed from the United States. The status of the applicant's child is not indicated in the record. The spouse states that he is thirty-years-old, has always lived in the United States, and was educated in English. He asserts that he would not be able to adapt to living in Venezuela and would not be able to receive proper medical services or find employment due to the political and economic situation in that country. In addition, he states that his step-daughter would not be able to receive the educational

opportunities that she is entitled to in the United States.

There are no laws that require the applicant's spouse to leave the United States and live abroad. Further, the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994). In Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

On appeal, the applicant's spouse also indicates that the decision to deny his wife's waiver request has impacted him psychologically. He states that he is depressed and suffering emotionally. There is no evidence contained in the record that the spouse has a significant condition of health for which treatment is unavailable in Venezuela.

In Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation.

The court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in Matter of Tijam, Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998), need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. The applicant in the present matter was already residing in the United States unlawfully when she married her spouse. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. However, as previously noted, consideration of the Attorney General's discretion is applicable only after extreme hardship has been established.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that the qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal social and economic disruptions involved in the removal of a family member. Hardship to the applicant herself or her daughter is not a consideration in section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) proceedings. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits

a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Matter of T--S--Y--, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.